Posiciones infundadas en la polémica sobre Mundos Posibles

Authors

  • Joaquín Santiago Toranzo Calderón

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.34096/cf.n67-68.5460

Keywords:

modal realism, possible worlds, logical necessity, metaphysical necessity

Abstract

In the controversy between actualists and modal realist, the notions of logical necessity and possibility have been used to answer the question for the existence of possible worlds, defending from them their metaphysical counterparts. However, can ome be defined purely in terms of the others? Or maybe something else is needed? In this paper it is shown that the relation between these notions assumes previous metaphysical commitments falling into a circular justification, so it can not be a viable option to answer such a question. 

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Issue

Section

Discusión: "Existencia y Mundos Posibles" (Eduardo Barrio, coord.)

How to Cite

Posiciones infundadas en la polémica sobre Mundos Posibles. (2017). Cuadernos De filosofía, 67-68, 125-131. https://doi.org/10.34096/cf.n67-68.5460